The Chinese M-11 is purported to be a Nuclear capable Ballistic Missile

Pakistan’s developed to necular  program? it’s big question he will be export to chinees weapon’s Pakistan’s nuclear odyssey was a direct consequence of India crossing the nuclear Rubicon. Its nuclear programme was a defensive response to a security paranoia, spawned by India’s role in the dismemberment of the country in 1971.

India’s testing of a nuclear device in 1974 was the last straw. Against a clear and present danger to the nation, Pakistan was already mulling over options to address its perpetual conventional force asymmetry with India, when the Indians – in pursuit of their grandiloquent geo-strategic objectives – conducted a nuclear test in 1974.

The “Smiling Buddha” epithet was an ironic allusion to India’s peace pretensions, and the irony was not lost on a worried international community, which came up with a punitive response against India’s use of a research reactor to develop weapons-grade fuel. The response was the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, which is now being cajoled into acquiescing to India’s original sin to break its nuclear isolation. A reluctant Pakistan was led pell-mell into nuclear testing in 1998, after highly provocative sabre rattling by the jingoistic Indian media in the wake of nuclear test explosions.


Chinese sourced Weishi-2 Ballistic Missile renamed by Pakistan at the NASR (Hatf-IX)

Pakistan responded to India’s nuclearisation through a uranium enrichment route that tested the limits of Pakistani scientists’ ingenuity and technological adroitness. Pakistan was a veritable example of the famous dictum by a nuclear thinker that “more is not necessary when less is enough”. Pakistan’s strategic equalisers, in the shape of air launched and missile-based weapons, were deemed to be sufficient antidotes to the Indian nuclear juggernaut, in a competition where the numbers did not matter. Pakistan, therefore, underwrote its security through deterrence based upon the minimum essential nuclear weapons, conceptualising the employment of weapons through a well-articulated and publicised (for transparency) doctrine of Credible Minimum Deterrence.

This doctrine relied on the sufficient number of nuclear weapons(ranging from 80 to 120, according to some estimates) based on air launched and ground-based missile warheads. There was a strategic logic, as well as a non-proliferation angle to Pakistan’s calculation, as it sought to avoid a costly nuclear arms race without sacrificing the credibility of its deterrence. Pakistan’s sedulous attempts at co-opting India into a Strategic Restraint Regime – based on the three interlocking elements of nuclear disarmament, conventional force reduction and dispute settlement – were spurned, as the deterrence stability was continually disturbed by India, both through vertical proliferation in nuclear arms and increasing conventional


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